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IV

INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
CLAUDIA MARTIN*

During the period covered by this report, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights
(hereinafter 'Court') issued several decisions on merits, including: Apitz Barberaet al.
vs Venezuela, CastailedaGutman vs Mexico, HeliodoroPortugalvsPanamd,Bayarrivs
Argentina, Tiu Tojin vs Guatemala, Ticona Estradaet al vs Bolivia, and Valle Jaramillo
et al vs Colombia.Also, the Court adopted several interpretation judgements clarifying
aspects of previous decisions on the merits, including: Miguel Castro-CastroPrisonvs
Peru,Albdn Cornejo et al. vs Ecuador,SaramakaPeople vs Suriname, GarciaPrieto et
al. vs El Salvador,and ChaparroAlvarez and Lapo Iiiiguez vs Ecuador.
The present report will analyse the Court's interpretation decision in Saramaka
People vs Suriname,complementing the Court's innovative approach in the judgement
on the merits, which was reported in the first issue of 2008. Also, the report will
discuss the Court's judgements in Apitz Barbera et al. vs Venezuela and Castalleda
Gutman vs United Mexican States, concerning the destitution of judges in Venezuela
and the scope of the right to political participation in Mexico, respectively.
Finally, the report will briefly describe the Advisory Opinion request recently
submitted by Argentina regarding the appointment of ad hoc judges in proceedings
before the Court.
The full text of the decisions mentioned in this report can be found in English on
the website of the Court at: www.corteidh.or.cr.
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TRIBAL COMMUNITY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS:
COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE SARAMAKA
PEOPLE JUDGEMENT ON THE MERITS

In the case of the Saramaka People vs Suriname,' the Court responds to the State's
request for an interpretation of several points on the judgement, merits, reparations
and costs of the Court's previous judgement of 28 November 2007.
In that judgement, the Court held that the Saramaka people constituted a tribal
community deserving special measures of protection similar to those afforded
to other indigenous groups because of their distinct social, cultural and economic
characteristics. In particular, the Court found that Suriname has a duty to recognise
and protect the Saramaka people's right to collectively own the land they have
traditionally used and occupied. Also, the Court concluded that the Saramaka tribe
can claim ownership of the natural resources that lied in and within their ancestral
territory because access to those resources is essential to their survival. The Court,
however, stated that the right to property under the American Convention on Human
Rights (hereinafter 'American Convention' or 'Convention') is not absolute and may,
therefore, be subject to permissible restrictions. In addition to the legality, legitimacy,
necessity and proportionality of a measure, the Court held that restrictions to the
Saramaka'sright to property must not deny their survival as a tribal people. Thus, the
Court articulated three safety measures that the State had to utilise when granting
a concession for the exploration and extraction of a natural resource in Saramaka
territory. First, the State had to consult the Saramaka people and ensure effective
participation in regards to any development, exploration, or extraction plan. In
cases of major developments or investment plans that could profoundly impact the
Saramaka people's property rights and affect their traditional territory, the State also
had to obtain the free, prior and informed consent of the Saramakas in accordance
with their traditions and customs. Secondly, the State had to guarantee that the
Saramaka people would receive a benefit from any activity that took place in and
within their property. Thirdly, the State could not issue any concession unless it had
consulted with an independent entity to assess the social and environmental impact
of the requested project. Finally, the Court found that lack of recognition of this tribal
community as a legal entity under domestic law violated Article 3 of the American
Convention, which protects the right to juridical personality.
In its interpretation judgement, the Court clarifies: (1) questions regarding the
establishment of a mechanism for the 'effective participation' of the Saramakapeople
and the determination of the beneficiaries of the 'just compensation' in cases that are

Inter-American Court of Human Rights, The Saramaka People vs Suriname, Interpretation of the
Judgment of Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgement of 12 August 2008,
Series C, No. 185.
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affected by development projects; (2) the circumstances in which the State may not
execute a proposed developmental and investment plan in Saramaka territory and
the concessions the State may grant in that territory; and (3) whether the State took
into consideration the State's arguments related to the violation of Article 3 of the
American Convention.
The Court first addressed the issue of how the State should establish a consultation
mechanism with the Saramaka people, and which tribe members must be involved
in consultations designed to ensure that the State complies with Saramaka customs
and traditions. The Court refers back to its original judgement in reminding the State
of the issues on which the State is required to consult with the Saramaka people,
including: (1) granting collective title over the territory of the Saramaka people; (2)
legally recognising the Saramaka people's collective juridical capacity; (3) adopting
measures to protect the Saramaka people's right to their territory, and obtaining
consent from the Saramaka community before acting on development or investment
plans that would affect Saramaka territory; (4) respecting and observing Saramaka
culture and traditions; and (5) prior assessments of environmental and social impact.
The Court reiterated that the State is not only required to consult with the Saramaka
people regarding any proposed activity that would occur within Saramaka territory,
but that the State must also obtain the free and informed consent of the Saramaka
people before acting on any development or investment projects that could impact
Saramaka land and natural resources. Implicit in the obligation to consult is the
State's duty to convey the information in a comprehensible and accessible format,
so that all in the Saramaka community know of the proposed activity. The Court
deliberately did not identify specific members of the Saramaka community who must
be consulted regarding proposed activity; instead, the Court leaves the designation
of who will represent the Saramaka people up to the Saramaka community. In doing
so, the Court explicitly places the burden of appointing these representatives, and
of informing the State who they have selected, on the Saramaka people. To this
point, the Court explains that the State must consult the Saramaka people when
determining the beneficiaries from the award and future judgement project. Further,
in the event of any conflict within the Saramaka community over who receives these
benefits, the Court ordered that the State should allow the Saramaka community to
resolve the conflict, in accordance with their own traditional customs and norms,
amongst its own members. The Court's interpretation demonstrates clear respect for
the autonomy of the Saramaka community in handling its own internal affairs, and
holds the State responsible for respecting this autonomy by communicating its plans
through the Saramaka-appointed representatives.
Next, the Court addressed the prior environmental and social impact assessments
requirement of its judgement. Here, the Court imposes a positive obligation on the
State to take special precautions to guarantee that the Saramaka people enjoy the full
benefit of their territories. In holding the State to this duty, the Court embraces a
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liberal definition of the term 'survival of a tribal people', and extends the meaning of
this term far beyond 'not endanger[ing] the life of the victims', which is the definition
the State supports. Instead, the Court guarantees 'social, cultural, and economic
survival' for the Saramaka people. The Court also elaborates on the purpose and
required content of the environmental and social impact assessments (hereinafter
'ESIAs'). The purpose of the ESIAs is to objectively assess the possible damage or
risk a proposed development or investment project may have on Saramakaterritory,
and to allow the Saramaka community to make an informed decision regarding such
development. Independent parties must perform the ESIAs in compliance with the
relevant international standards and best practices. The independent parties must
work with State supervision in undertaking the ESIAs. Although it recognised some
flexibility in evaluating whether an ESIA shows an acceptable level of impact, the
Court declared the potential for the Saramakapeople to continue survival as a tribal
people to be the determinative standard.
Third, the Court clarified that it expected the State and Saramaka people to work
together to adopt legislative and administrative measures to 'recognize, protect,
guarantee, and give legal effect' to the Saramakapeople over their territory.2 Although
the Court does allow the State to restrict the Saramakas' use and enjoyment of their
property, the Court clarified that the Saramakapeople have the right to manage the
land in accordance with their traditions and culture. In discussing the States' ability
to grant limited concessions in relation to the Saramakaland, the Court reiterates that
the 'State has a duty to comply with its obligations under the American Convention as
interpreted by the [its] jurisprudence, particularly in light of the Case of the Saramaka
People and other cases involving indigenous and tribal peoples' land rights.'3
The Court finds that the State's inquiry related to Article 3 of the Convention, which
argues that the Saramakapeople do not benefit from the Convention's guarantee of
the right to recognition before the law for every 'person' since the tribe is a 'distinct
people', is outside the scope of a request for interpretation. Nonetheless, the Court
points the State to the portions of its judgement where it clearly states that, although
the Saramaka people are a distinct tribal group, its members enjoy specific rights. It
also refers to a subtle exception the Court creates, which allows it to apply Article 3 to
the member of indigenous and tribal people who 'use and enjoy property collectively
in accordance with their ancestral traditions'. 4

2

3
4

Ibidem, at para. 48.
Ibidem, at para. 54.
Ibidem, at para. 64.
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2.

INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN VENEZUELA

Apitz Barbera et al. vs Venezuela5 is the first case in which the Court addresses the
current situation of the judiciary in Venezuela. The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (hereinafter 'Commission') and civil society organisations have
expressed concerns over the Venezuelan system of the administration of justice in
recent years, in particular regarding the continuing appointment of provisional
judges and prosecutors. 6 This situation affects the independence and impartiality of
the judiciary, and consequently, Venezuelans' right to access to justice.
The Supreme Court of Tribunal Justice (hereinafter 'TSJ') appointed the
petitioners to be provisional judges of Venezuela's First Court of Administrative
Disputes (hereinafter 'First Court'). The First Court has jurisdiction over cases
dealing with administrative acts adopted by organs of the Executive Branch, except
those issued by the President and Ministers. Once the petitioners were appointed,
the First Court ruled against several government policies and decided controversial
cases. One decision in particular, which required foreign volunteer doctors to meet
strict licensing requirements before practicing medicine in poor neighbourhoods in
Venezuela, received significant criticism from the press and came under public attack
from Venezuela's president who refused to enforce the decision.
The First Court also nullified an administrative act by the Subaltern Registrar of
the First Circuit of the Public Registrar of the Municipality of Baruta of the State of
Miranda (hereinafter 'Subaltern Registrar'). In turn, the Subaltern Registrar solicited
the Chamber for Political and Administrative Matters (CPAM) of the TSJ to intervene
in the First Court's holding and uphold the administrative act. CPAM requires a
direct public interest or a threat of flagrant injustice before removing proceedings
from a competent court. On 3 June 2003, the CPAM nullified the First Court's order,
finding that the Court's decision was a 'grave and inexcusable error'. The CPAM sent
a copy of its order to the Inspector General of Tribunals (IGT), who commenced an
official investigation of the First Court's decision. The IGT is an ancillary body to
the Commission for Operating and Restructuring of the Judicial System (hereinafter
'CORJS'), with powers to gather evidence for instituting disciplinary proceedings
against judges. The CORJS has, inter alia, the power to act as a disciplinary tribunal.
Both bodies were set up provisionally until new laws regulating the administration of
justice in Venezuela were passed, pursuant to the new Constitution of 1999.
s
6
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When the IGT presented the results of its investigation to the CORJS, this organ
issued an order making four of the five judges destitute. Of the five judges, one was
exempt from the sanction and another subsequently pardoned. In both cases, the
judges were protected because they had previously completed the requirements for
retirement.
On 13 November 2003, two of the petitioners filed a hierarchical recourse with
the TSJ, arguing that only that Court had disciplinary powers over the members of
the First Court. The Court failed to file a timely response, which is ninety days after
the filing under Venezuelan law. It finally responded after nine months and 26 days,
rejecting the petition. On 27 November 2003, petitioners filed administrative actions
for a protective injunction (amparo)against and nullification of the destitution order
with the CPAM of the TSJ, alleging: 1) violation of the right to be judged by their
natural judge; 2) the right to defence and due process; 3) a presumption of innocence;
4) independence of jurisdictional function; and 5) the existence of a misuse of power.
The CPAM issued a decision on the protective injunction more than three years after
the action was filed, but had not issued a decision on the solicitation for nullification
of the destitution order by the time the Court issued its judgement.
Before analysing the merits of the decision, it is worth noting a procedural aspect
that the Court addressed for the first time. In their submission, petitioners argued
the violation of a right of the American Convention that had been rejected by the
Commission in its admissibility decision. The Court held that petitioners may allege
violations not included in the Commission's petition even if those were declared
inadmissible by that organ. The Court stated that it has the power to review those
inadmissibility reports because the Commission only makes a primafacie analysis of
the merits of the allegations. Though the Court has long accepted the victim's right to
allege violations not included in the Commission's submissions, it had never decided
before on a case in which the particular allegation was declared inadmissible by the
Commission.
In the analysis on the merits, the Court's judgement in Apitz Barbera further
developed and solidified individual due process rights, and contributed to
strengthening the protection that judges - even provisional ones - must be afforded
under the American Convention. The Court underlined that provisional judges should
be ensured conditions to exercise their role independently; therefore, rules applicable
to permanent tenured judges on promotion, transfer and distribution of cases, as
well as suspension and/or removal from office should be equally applied to those
provisionally appointed. The relevance of this decision, thus, must be underscored
given the weaknesses of the judiciary in many of the States Parties to the American
Convention.
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In regard to the scope of Article 8, the Court reiterated its previous jurisprudence
in Yatama vs Nicaragua,7 indicating that States must afford the minimum due
process rights listed in paragraph 1 of that provision not only in judicial but also in
administrative procedures, whenever the determination of a right is at issue.8 Since
petitioners were afforded a procedure when removed from office, the Court next
analysed whether such procedure respected minimum due process rights.
First, the Court concluded that Venezuela did not violate the petitioners' rights to
be judged by a competent tribunal, as consecrated under Article 8(1) of the American
Convention, because the CORJS was granted jurisdiction to hear disciplinary cases
against Venezuelan judges and no alternative internal standard provided for the
hearing of the case by a different judicial body. Moreover, the STJ, in a recourse
submitted by the petitioners, upheld the CORJS jurisdiction to hear the disciplinary
case against the judges of the First Court. The Court also found that the State did not
violate petitioners' right to be heard by the CPAM when reviewing the First Court's
decision, because the declaration of inexcusable error in a proceeding does not involve
a determination of the rights of the judge who is under investigation, nor does it place
the judge in an adversarial position. Additionally, it concluded that Venezuela did not
violate petitioners' right to a hearing because Article 8(1) of the Convention does not
require an oral representation in all proceedings. Though the Court may consider
an oral hearing as a due process right, petitioners must justify the need for such a
hearing in a particular case. Also, the Court held that it was incompetent to decide
whether the five judges of the First Court were treated equally when three of them
were sanctioned with destitution while the other two were granted retirement without
being sanctioned. Therefore, the Court found no violations of Articles 24 and 23(1) of
the Convention, protecting the rights to equal treatment before the law and access to
public functions under general conditions of equality, respectively. Nor did Venezuela
violate the general clause of non-discrimination under Article 1(1) of the American
Convention in relation to the substantive right to be heard in a reasonable time as
consecrated in Article 8(1) of the same treaty. Finally, the Court found that Article
29 of the Convention enshrines the interpretation principles to properly construe the
scope of the rights protected in that instrument. Thus, this provision does not protect
any individual right and consequently cannot be found independently violated.
The Court did, however, find that Venezuela had violated the petitioners' rights on
several counts. First, the Court found that the State failed to provide sufficient grounds
for the motivation of the order for destitution against the petitioners. Both the IGC's

7
8
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accusation and the CORJS's removal order limited themselves to repeat the CPAM's
declaration, without providing for an independent reasoning. The Court concluded
that while an appeal procedure - such as the one in which the CPAM intervened
- intends to review a lower court's decision, a disciplinary procedure assesses the
conduct and performance of a judge as a public official. Consequently, both the IGC
and CORJS should have decided the merits of the destitution request on the basis
of the arguments and evidence submitted by the petitioners, and not merely on the
CPAM's decision holding that the First Court's judgement constituted a grave and
inexcusable error.
The Court also found that Venezuela violated the petitioners' rights to be judged
by an impartial and independent tribunal, as conforms to Article 8(1), in relation
to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention. On the first ground, the Court
concluded that State's legislation prohibiting the parties from challenging the
members of the CORJS violated the right to an impartial tribunal. Furthermore, the
ad hoc nature of the CORJS failed to provide sufficient guaranty of the independence
of its members from undue influence. Though the Court was not able to prove that
the removal of the petitioners in the present case was the result of pressure exerted by
the Executive Branch, it concluded that there was no established procedure to appoint
and remove the members of the CORJS, and that these functions were carried at the
sole discretion of the STJ. Petitioners also argued that the case at issue reflected a
practice of lack of independence of Venezuela's judiciary on the whole due to influence
from the executive branch or as a result of the 'ideological purification' of judiciary
members. The Court, however, was unable to prove such allegation and rejected it.
Moreover, the Court found that Venezuela violated petitioners' rights to be heard
in a timely manner, under Articles 8(1) and 1(1) of the American Convention, by
the delay of the TSJ and CPAM in response to the requests for nullification of the
destitution order. The State also violated the rights of petitioners to have a simple and
prompt recourse for their complaints, under Articles 25(1) and 1(1) of the Convention,
by the delay of the CPAM in response to the request for a protective injunction
(amparo)against the destitution order.
The Court issued several reparations, designed to require the State to remedy the
injury caused to the petitioners' careers and reputations. First, the Court declared
that due to the material damages, including loss of income and economic prejudice
due to destitution, the State owed each plaintiff USD 48,000. In addition to this
amount, the Court ordered the State to pay each plaintiff another USD 40,000 for
immaterial damages, including the injury of suffering moral prejudice and the delay
in proceedings of their legal recourse. Furthermore, the State must reimburse each
of the petitioners for the sum of USD 5,000 for costs and expenses incurred in the
litigation of this case, which includes payment of their legal representative and future
related expenses. In total, the State would pay damages amounting to USD 279,000.
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In terms of the measures of satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, the Court
required the State to reassign the petitioners, if they so wish, to judiciary offices which
are comprised of the remuneration, social benefits and all other equitable elements
that would correspond to their position had they not suffered the destitution. If such
a reassignment is untenable, with good cause, after six months, then Venezuela must
pay each of the petitioners in equity USD 100,000 within 18 months of this decision.
Second, the Court ordered the State to publish specific sections of their decision
in the Official Gazette and one other newspaper of broad circulation. Third, the
Court demanded that the State adopt a legislative course to approve the Ethical and
Disciplinary Code of Venezuelan Judges within one year, which must guarantee both
the impartiality of the disciplinary organ, as well as its independence, by regulating an
adequate process of nominating members and assuring its stability in performance.
Finally, the Court ordered the State to issue a public apology to the petitioners.

3.

THE RIGHT TO BE ELECTED AS AN INDEPENDENT
CANDIDATE

In Castaileda Gutman vs Mexico,9 the Court decided for the first time whether
electoral laws prohibiting individuals to run for political office as independent
candidates breached Article 23 of the American Convention consecrating the right to
participate in government. The Court acknowledged the relevance of this issue when
it mentioned that about half of the State parties to the Convention recognised the
monopoly of political parties to nominate candidates for elections.
On 5 March 2004, Jorge Castafieda Gutman submitted to the Federal Electoral
Institute (hereinafter 'IFE') a petition for the 2006 presidential elections of the
United Mexican states as an independent candidate. In response to the request, the
IFE authority informed Mr Castafieda that his request could not be met, because the
registration period for presidential candidacy was not until a year and a half later between 1-15 January 2006. Furthermore, the IFE concluded that, in accordance with
Article 175 of the Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures (hereinafter
'COFIPE'), only candidates registered under a national political party could run for
presidency.
On 29 March 2004, Castafieda challenged that decision by filing a writ on amparo
at the federal level. The federal court proceeding concluded with the ruling of the
Mexican Supreme Court Justice. The Supreme Court refused to hold a trial on amparo
stating that it had no jurisdiction with respect to electoral matters. Therefore, the
issue on Article 175 of COFIPE rests with legislation and Castafieda had no form of

redress.
9
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In its decision on the merits, the Court analyses the alleged violations of Articles
25 (right to judicial protection), 23 (right to participate in government) and 24 (right
to equal protection), together with the general duties to respect and ensure as well as
to adopt domestic measures set in Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention. The
Court held that it had jurisdiction to review the alleged violation of Articles 23 and
24 even though the Commission had looked into this issue and found it inadmissible
under Article 47 of the Convention. As in Apitz Barberaet al.,10 the Court declared
that individuals have the right to invoke additional rights to those submitted by the
Commission, even if the latter rejects the alleged violations to those rights at the
admissibility stage.
The Court found that, at the time this case transpired, the existing legislation in
Mexico failed to afford the petitioner the right to an effective remedy as consecrated
in Article 25 of the Convention. The State argued that petitioner should have availed
himself of the 'action for protection of the political and electoral rights of the citizen'
(hereinafter 'action for protection of political rights') before the Federal Tribunal on
Electoral Matters to challenge IFE's resolution not to register him as an independent
candidate; however, the Court found that the alleged remedy did not effectively address
Castafieda's complaints. First, the Court evaluated the accessibility of the remedy for
the petitioner and concluded that the Law on Contesting Electoral Matters (LCEM),
which regulates the action for protection of political rights, prevented Mr Castafieda
from filing the action. Article 80 of LCEM requires that only a candidate nominated
by a political party can file an action for protection. The action for protection of
political rights was not an available remedy for Castafieda, because he intended to
run as an independent candidate. Second, the Court concluded that, additionally, the
action for protection of political rights is an ineffective remedy because the LCEM
asserts that such an action is inapt to challenge the constitutionality of federal or
local electoral laws. Moreover, the Mexican Supreme Court, through its case-law,
ruled that the Federal Tribunal on Electoral Matters has no jurisdiction to decide on
the constitutionality of laws. In the instant case, upholding the petitioner's right to
run for President would have required him to challenge the constitutionality of the
existing legislation prohibiting the participation of independent candidates. Such a
challenge directly contradicts the Mexican legislation, which in turn, interferes with
the action for the protection of political rights - rendering the action ineffective to
address Castafieda's complaints.
Third, the Court considered whether the writ on amparo was the effective remedy
under Mexican domestic legislation to protect the rights of the petitioner. The
application of amparo, a simple and prompt remedy that protects against violations
of constitutional rights, is specifically banned under Mexican legislation to resolve
claims of violations of electoral rights. Furthermore, according to Article 105 of
10

Supra note 5.
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the Constitution, the only available procedure to challenge the constitutionality of
electoral laws is through an unconstitutionality remedy that may be filed solely by
a percentage of members of the Federal House of Representatives, the Senate, the
Attorney General, or the political parties registered with the IFE. Thus, the Court
concluded that there was no available constitutional remedy in Mexico that would
provide the petitioner with an effective remedy to protect against the alleged violation
of his electoral rights and therefore held Mexico in breach of Articles 25, 1(1) and 2 of
the American Convention.
In regards to the political rights of the petitioner, the Court found that the
prohibition of independent candidates running for office in the Mexican electoral
system is not a breach of Article 23 of the American Convention, which consecrates,
inter alia, the right to vote and be elected. After underscoring the core importance of
the right to political participation in a democratic society, the Court reasoned that
Article 23(1)(b) of the Convention requires States to hold 'genuine period elections,
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secrete ballot that guarantees
the free expression of the voters'. However, the Convention does not require States to
adopt any particular electoral system in order to ensure respect of those principles.
The Court also analysed the scope of Article 23(2) stating that electoral
laws may establish restrictions to the right to be elected 'only on the basis of age,
nationality, residence, language, education, civil and mental capacity, or sentencing
by a competent court in criminal proceedings'. The petitioner's argued that 'only'
should be strictly interpreted as setting the exclusive grounds according to which
the right to be elected can be restricted. In contrast, the Court adopted a flexible
approach reasoning that the organisation of the electoral process may require the
establishment of additional limitations to ensure the protection of political rights.
Those limitations are permissible, however, if they are established by law, pursue a
legitimate aim, and are proportional to the ends they intend to meet. In assessing
the Mexican legislation banning independent candidates from running for political
office, the Court concluded that the measure is established by law in Article 175 of
COFIPE and is appropriately designed to organise the political process while ensuring
accessibility, under equal conditions, for all citizens exercising their political rights.
Furthermore, the measure is necessary to respond to social needs that are imperative
on various historical, political and social reasons, including: the need to build and
strengthen the party system in response to a political and historical reality; the need
to organise effectively the electoral process in a society of 75 million voters; the need
for a predominantly public financial system to ensure free and genuine elections;
and the need to effectively monitor the funds used in the elections. Additionally,
the Court found that the measure is not disproportionate because the petitioner had
other avenues to run for office, specifically by joining a political party and obtaining
a nomination; becoming an external candidate of a political party without officially
joining the party; setting up his own political party; or creating a national political
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group that reaches a participation agreement with a political party. In sum, the Court
found that Mexico's system of candidacy registration neither constitutes an unlawful
restriction of the right to be elected under Article 23(1)(b) of the Convention nor is it
in violation of Article 23 in general.
Noteworthy is that the Court distinguished the holding in the instant case from
that of Yatama vs Nicaragua." In Yatama, the Court held that the restrictions imposed
upon candidates of indigenous and ethnic communities of the Atlantic Coast of
Nicaragua, which required electoral participation only through a political party, were
alien to their practices, customs and forms of organisation and, thus, constituted a
violation of their right to political participation. The Court justified its holding in
Yatama on the bases of the vulnerable and marginal role that these communities
played in Nicaragua's political process. Unlike the candidates in Yatama, Castafieda
is a mainstream candidate who did not face any disadvantage as to his opportunities
to run for office.
Lastly, the Court found no violation of the right to equality under the law
recognised in Article 24 of the Convention. In this regard, the Court concluded
that differences between the local and federal legislation regarding the nomination
of independent candidates were not sufficient to prove the existence of an unlawful
distinction, because local and federal elections were not comparable.
In terms of reparations, the Court concluded that since the petitioner based his
claim for damages on the alleged violation of Article 23 of the Convention, there was
no need to rule on this matter. The Court, nevertheless, declared that Mexico must
introduce in its internal laws the necessary modifications to abide by its international
obligations. On 11 November 2007, Mexico passed a constitutional reform
awarding jurisdiction to the Federal Tribunal on Electoral Matters to decide on the
constitutionality of electoral laws. The Court pointed out that within a reasonable
time the new reform must be adapted to coincide with the regulations stipulated in
the Convention. Also, the Court ordered the State to publish the judgement of the
Court in the Official Gazette and in another widely circulated national news within
six months from the notification of the sentence. Finally, the State must pay USD
7,000 dollars as costs and expenses incurred in the litigation of this case.

"

Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Yatama vs Nicaragua,supra note 7.
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4.

ADVISORY OPINION REQUEST SUBMITTED BY
ARGENTINA

On 14 August 2008, Argentina filed an Advisory Opinion request asking the Court to
interpret the scope of Article 55 of the American Convention, which states:
1. If a judge is a national of any of the States Parties to a case submitted to the Court,
he shall retain his right to hear that case.
2. If one of the judges called upon to hear a case should be a national of one of the
States Parties to the case, any other State Party in the case may appoint a person of
its choice to serve on the Court as an ad hoc judge.
3. If among the judges called upon to hear a case none is a national of any of the
States Parties to the case, each of the latter may appoint an ad hoc judge.
4. An ad hoc judge shall possess the qualifications indicated in Article 52.
5. If several States Parties to the Convention should have the same interest in a case,
they shall be considered as a single party for purposes of the above provisions. In
case of doubt, the Court shall decide.
In its request to the Court, Argentina raises two issues it would like the Court to
consider and address. First, the State argues that the possibility of appointing an ad hoc
judge should be limited to cases between States, and not extended to cases where one of
the parties is an individual. Argentina urges the Court to re-examine Article 55(3) of
the American Convention and reasons that the legal rationale of appointing an ad hoc
judge only applies when the Court must decide a case where one State accuses another
State of failing to comply with its international obligations. When this rationale is
applied to a case that does not arise from an inter-State dispute, the State argues that
the legal justification falls apart because allowing the appointment of an ad hoc judge
where one of the parties is an individual would create an inequality in the proceedings
between the presumed victim, the Commission, and the defendant State. The second
issue the State raises is whether a judge who is national of the defendant State should
disqualify himself from the case when the case arises from an individual petition.
The State argues that adopting such a rule is necessary to protect the Court from
potential bias or influence, arguing that allowing a judge who shares the nationality
of a presumed individual victim to decide a case is an 'unnecessary risk' which could
easily be eliminated through that judge's recusal. Argentina argues that interpreting
Article 55(1) of the Convention, in harmony with Article 29 clarifies that the right of a
judge to remain on a case where one of the parties shares his nationality is limited to
cases that arise from inter-State petitions, and does not extend to cases arising from
individual petition.
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